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ABSTRACT. Incentivizing private landowners and other stakeholders is central to the effective conservation of ecosystem
services in working landscapes. To better understand how to design effective incentives, the perceptions of landowners and
other stakeholders are explored regarding a proposed approach to clearing invasive alien plants on private land in the Western
Cape Province, South Africa. The public funded national program, Working for Water, conserves ecosystem services while
employing and training people from marginalized sectors of society to clear these plants. Private landowner involvement is a
key conservation challenge, because without adequate landowner involvement, invasive alien plants persist on the landscape
and continuously reinvade cleared areas. We collected interview data from private landowners in three study sites, and web-
survey data from conservation professionals and Working for Water managers, in order to compare stakeholder perceptions of
(1) government and landowners’ responsibilities for clearing invasive alien plants; (2) existing and proposed policy tools; and
(3) the extent to which stakeholders consider the proposed financial incentive to be sufficient. There was significant consensus
among stakeholders concerning their preference for shared landowner and government responsibility and for a policy mix that
combines incentives with disincentives. Landowners from the three study sites differed in the level of responsibility they were
willing to assume. Stakeholders also diverged in terms of their perceptions of the proposed financial incentives. Furthermore,
the perspectives of landowners were strongly associated with ecological and social features of the landscapes in which they are
located. Understanding stakeholders’ points of view within their differing contexts is shown to be a valuable means of gaining
insight into the opportunities and constraints that face ecosystem service conservation in working landscapes.
Key Words: ecosystem services; invasive alien plants; landowner incentives; private land; stakeholder analysis; Western Cape;
Working for Water; working landscapes
INTRODUCTION
Ecosystem services (ESs) are the material and nonmaterial
benefits humans derive from nature (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment 2005). Resource management initiatives
worldwide have embraced ES concepts as a means to align
ecological conservation with socioeconomic decisions related
to the environment (Daily et al. 2009). ES approaches are
based on a recognition that conservation targets cannot be
achieved in formal protected areas alone, thus there is a need
to integrate conservation into the routine activities taking place
on private lands, i.e., on production (e.g., agricultural) and
nonproduction (e.g., residential) lands. Landowners may lack
incentives to safeguard ESs and as such, ES approaches often
require the design of novel institutions (North 1990, Ostrom
1990) to enhance service delivery. Examples of institutional
arrangements for ESs include financial incentives, legal
regulations, and motivational tools (i.e., extension services,
education, and information) (Young et al. 1996, Botha 2001). 
Designing institutions to fit the social, economic, and
ecological context of the systems they aim to protect presents
a core ES policy and management challenge (Folke et al. 2007,
Jack et al. 2008). Often the scale of ES management extends
over several property boundaries, which requires broad-based
stakeholder cooperation (Goldman et al. 2007, Cowling et al.
2008). Stakeholders may hold varying perspectives on ES
values, approaches, and outcomes (Turner 2008).
Furthermore, many ESs by their nature constitute public
benefits (e.g., water availability, biodiversity), and institutions
for promoting effective ES delivery often need to address the
property rights, responsibilities, and economic self-interests
of private landowners (Hanna et al. 1997, Goldman et al.
2007).  
Engagement with key stakeholders at the outset is critical for
the design of effective ES institutions and, ultimately, the
successful uptake of ES initiatives (Grimble and Wellard
1997, Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Cowling et al. 2008, Reed
2008). Until recently, literature on ESs has focused on
biophysical and economic valuation aspects, rather than
dealing explicitly with stakeholder values and perceptions
(Menzel and Teng 2010). There is a pressing need to examine
stakeholder perspectives of ES initiatives in order to guide the
design of policy instruments that are consistent with a
particular ecological, social, and economic situation, and with
the capabilities of institutions and stakeholders (Cocklin et al.
2007). Although many of these conditions are likely to be
location specific (Wandel and Smithers 2000, Siebert et al.
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Table 1. Summary of Working for Water’s (WfW) proposed approach to clear invasive alien plants (IAPs) on private land in
the Western Cape, South Africa.
 Policy Tool Proposed Action Action Goals
Incentives
Financial assistance WfW provides 100% of the labor costs for the
initial clearing, 75% of the labor costs for the first
follow-up clearing, 50% of the labor costs for the
second follow-up clearing, and 100% of the
herbicide costs for the initial clearing and three
follow-up clearings.
Overcome barriers in landowners’ financial
capacity to clear IAPs. Facilitate greater sharing
between WfW and private landowners of the costs
for clearing IAPs.
Extension services WfW provides expert advice on clearing methods,
training, and management support.
Provide landowners with guidance, assistance, and
motivation to bring IAPs under control.
Disincentives
National regulations Enforcement of national mandates (CARA† and
NEMBA ‡) that hold landowners accountable for
clearing IAPs on their land.
Reinforce landowner motivation to clear IAPs on
their property.
Landowner contracts Enforcement of legally binding agreements
between WfW and landowners. Landowners agree
to pay the remaining portion of the clearing costs
during the subsidy period, and to maintain the
subsequent follow-up work.
Compel landowner accountability for the control of
IAPs on their property and facilitate long-term
sustainability in the control of the IAPs.
† The Care of Agricultural Resources Act (Act 43 of 1983, amended in 2001)
‡ The National Environmental Management and Biodiversity Act (Act 10 of 2004)
2006, Winter et al. 2007), several ecological and social factors,
including organizational affiliation (Prell et al. 2010),
economic dependence on property (Moon and Cocklin 2011),
nature or stewardship ethic (Kabii and Horwitz 2006),
familiarity with the management practice (Schirmer et al.
2012) and communication and information networks (Siebert
et al. 2006), have been demonstrated to be influential in the
conservation perceptions and policy preferences of
stakeholders. Studies designed to highlight variation in
perceptions and preferences for ES conservation across
stakeholder groups and geographical areas that encompass
variation in these factors are rare, however. 
We investigate the perceptions of diverse stakeholders
regarding an ES scheme to clear invasive alien plants (IAPs)
on private land in the Western Cape, South Africa. Working
for Water (WfW) is a government initiative established in 1995
to sustainably control IAPs “in order to contribute to economic
empowerment, social equity and ecological integrity” in South
Africa (Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 2007:2).
WfW employs and trains people from marginalized sectors of
society to clear IAPs from waterways and other ecologically
sensitive habitats. IAPs displace native species, result in
dramatic water losses (Van Wilgen et al. 1998, Le Maitre et
al. 2000, Marais and Wannenburgh 2008), and increase fire
intensity and frequency as well as soil erosion in invaded areas,
thereby affecting ESs (Van Wilgen 2009). Private landowners’
participation is an important challenge for WfW to address
(Woodworth 2006, Guy Preston, personal communication),
because the majority of land in South Africa is privately
owned. Without landowner support, IAPs persist on the
landscape and continuously reinvade cleared areas.  
In 2008, WfW proposed a new combination of incentives and
disincentives to promote landowner clearing of IAPs, entitled,
“Approach to Work on Private Land” (Table 1; http://www.
dwaf.gov.za/wfw/control). Outcomes of this new approach are
highly dependent on the extent to which the proposed
incentives align with stakeholders’ perceptions, values, and
needs, so as to influence their behavior. Currently, the diversity
of stakeholder orientations toward IAPs and their management
are not well understood (G. Preston, personal communication). 
Our objective is to describe and contextualize the perceptions
of private landowners, conservation professionals, and
managers within WfW regarding key aspects of WfW’s
proposed Approach to Work on Private Land. We compared
perceptions of these key stakeholder groups, and perceptions
of landowners across three study sites, regarding: (1)
government and landowners’ responsibilities for clearing IAP;
(2) the use of existing and proposed policy tools, including
legal mandates, financial assistance, and extension services,
as incentives for landowners to clear IAPs; and (3) the extent
to which the quantity and duration of WfW’s proposed
financial assistance are considered sufficient to offset
landowners’ costs for clearing IAPs on their property.
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Table 2. Characteristics of landowner study sites, Western Cape (n = number of respondents at each site).
 Variable Wilderness (n = 41) Grabouw (n = 37) Citrusdal (n = 35)
Latitude and longitude 33º59’32”S, 22º35’0” E 34º9’15”S, 19º0’46”E 32º35’29.94”S, 19º0’45”E
Climate † Maritime Mediterranean - high rainfall Mediterranean - semi-arid
Mean annual precipitation (mm) > 1200 < 600 < 300
Mean monthly maximum temperature (°C) 28 in February 29 in February 22 in February
Mean monthly minimum temperature (°C) 14 in July 7 in February 10 in July
Mean property size (ha) 6 300 1700
Primary land use Residential private property
highly interspersed with public
parklands
Agricultural and lifestyle private
property moderately interspersed
with public parkland
Agricultural private property not
interspersed with public parklands
Primary agricultural products N/A Apples and grapes Citrus fruit and rooibos
Previous experience working with WFW
(% of interviewees)
Low (22%) Medium (30%) High (66%)
IAP distribution Dispersed across waterways and
upland areas
Dispersed across waterways and
upland areas
Concentrated along waterways
† Climate data are from world weather on-line (www.worldweatheronline.com).
METHODS
Study area
The Western Cape Province occupies 129,386 km2 at the
southern tip of Africa, and lies within the Cape Floristic Region
(CFR): a biodiversity and ES hotspot globally recognized for
its exceptional endemic flora (Cowling and Richardson 1995)
and as a source of a substantial portion of South Africa’s
surface water supply (Turpie et al. 2008). Most land is
privately owned, with less than 3% located in protected areas
(Rebelo and Siegfried 1992), and agriculture is a primary
industry (Orkin 1998).  
Invasion by alien plants, particularly trees and large shrub
species, poses a significant threat to the indigenous flora, water
resources, and other ESs in the Western Cape (Van Wyk 1987,
Le Maitre et al. 1996, Van Wilgen 2009). Dominant IAPs
include wattles (Acacia and Paraserianthes spp.), blue gums
(Eucalyptus spp.), hakeas (Hakea spp.) and pines (Pinus spp.).
Control of these IAPs can prove challenging due to their rapid
growth rates, copious seed production, wide dispersal
distances, large and long-lived soil seed banks, and adaptations
to fire, in particular post-fire flushes of IAP seedlings (Marais
and Wannenburgh 2008, Van Wilgen 2009). Previously
cleared areas can revert to heavily invaded areas if funds or
capacity do not allow for prompt postfire follow-up (Holmes
et al. 2008, Pretorius et al. 2008).  
IAPs in the Western Cape have a long history (Witt 2003, Van
Wilgen 2009). Early in the 19th century, the State embarked
on extensive alien tree growing campaigns to render South
Africa independent of international wood and timber markets.
Landowners were encouraged to cultivate alien trees through
incentives and tree growing competitions. By the 1960s a
subset of alien species was recognized as problematic, and
widespread campaigns to remove IAPs were initiated in the
1980s. The 1983 Conservation of Agricultural Resource Act
(Act 43 of 1983, amended in 2001) and the 2004 National
Environmental Management Biodiversity Act (Act 10 of
2004) place restrictions on the growth, propagation, and trade
of designated IAP species on public and private land.
Sample selection
Landowner study sites and landowners
We purposively selected three landowner study sites to
represent variation in biophysical and land use contexts that
have been demonstrated to influence landowner perceptions
and management of ecosystem services in the Western Cape
(Winter et al. 2007, Roura-Pascual et al. 2009) and elsewhere
(Curtis and Robertson 2003, Moon and Cocklin 2011). Thus,
our findings potentially have a broader relevance to settings
beyond the scope of this study. These study sites were also
identified by WfW as potential pilot project areas for their new
Approach to Work on Private Land. Profiles of the landowner
research sites are provided in Table 2.  
The landowner stakeholder group includes property owners
or land managers with primary decision making authority on
the property. For each study site, we obtained a comprehensive
list of landowners from a local land management agency. After
excluding landowners with properties sizes ≤1 ha, we
randomly selected potential respondents from this list, who
were then requested by telephone to participate in an interview.
Response rates of 88%, 78%, and 94% were attained in
Wilderness, Grabouw, and Citrusdal, respectively. The
realized sample consisted of 113 landowners, divided more or
less equally across the three study sites (41 in Wilderness, 37
in Grabouw and 35 in Citrusdal).
Conservation professionals
The conservation professional stakeholder group includes
provincial government and NGO land managers, researchers,
and policy makers with experience working on the
management of IAPs on private land. Respondents were
initially identified by WfW management. Subsequent
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Table 3. Variables used in analysis of stakeholder perceptions regarding WfW’s proposed ecosystem service (ES) approach to
clearing IAPs on private land, Western Cape.
 Variable Attributes
Respondent category
Stakeholder group Categorical; landowner, conservation professional, WfW manager
Landowner study site Categorical; Wilderness, Grabouw, Citrusdal
Closed-ended questionnaire item
Extent to which responsibility should be shared Categorical; shared, unshared, unsure
Level of responsibility Categorical; solely or primarily landowner, equal landowner and government, solely or
primarily government
Level of support for regulatory enforcement Categorical; agree, disagree, unsure
Level of support for motivational incentives Categorical; agree, disagree, unsure
Level of support for monetary incentives Categorical; agree, disagree, unsure
Opinion on sufficiency of subsidy quantity Categorical; fully sufficient, somewhat sufficient, not at all sufficient, unsure
Opinion on sufficiency of subsidy duration Categorical; fully sufficient, somewhat sufficient, not at all sufficient, unsure
Open-ended questionnaire item
Emergent themes – responsibility Dummy; 1 = present, 0 = absent
Emergent themes – financial structure Dummy; 1 = present, 0 = absent
respondents were selected based on peer recommendation,
using a snowball sampling technique (Biernacki and Waldorf
1981) until no new respondents were suggested. In total, 47
conservation professionals were invited via e-mail to complete
an online questionnaire, and a 55% response rate (26
responses) was achieved.
WfW managers
All WfW managers in the Western Cape were invited via e-
mail and telephone to complete an online questionnaire. The
questionnaire was sent to 32 managers, and we received 18
responses (a 56% response rate). Citing limited computer
access and time, two questionnaires were submitted by
managers as joint responses. Therefore, the 18 cases reflect
the perspectives of a slightly larger number of WfW managers.
Data collection
Our data were obtained in 2009 from face to face, semi-
structured interviews with private landowners, and online
questionnaires (administered with Checkbox 4.6 online survey
software at http://www.checkbox.com) completed by local
conservation professionals and WfW managers.  
Data collection tools included a combination of closed- and
open-ended questions. The former allowed the quantitative
measurement of key constructs, while the latter allowed
stakeholders’ perceptions to emerge without preempting, and
provided qualitative data (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003,
Creswell 2009). Participation was voluntary; informed
consent was obtained and confidentiality assurances given to
all respondents.  
The data collection tools were reviewed by WfW management
and experts in several conservation organizations. We also
piloted the landowner interview schedule with three
respondents not included in the sample, to ensure the
questionnaire items were appropriate for the Western Cape
context.
Analyses
We used a concurrent mixed methods analytic approach
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003, Creswell 2009), combining
qualitative and statistical methods to examine the relationship
between perceptions of the policy principles and the financial
structure of WfW’s proposed approach (dependent variables)
and the following two independent variables: (1) stakeholder
group (all respondents), and (2) study site (landowners only)
(Table 3). 
With regard to (1), we tested for associations between
stakeholder group and participants’ responses to seven closed-
ended questionnaire items using chi-square analysis (P ≤ 
0.05). We conducted the analysis of (2) in several stages. First,
as with (1), we tested for associations between landowner
study site and participants’ responses to closed-ended
questionnaire items using chi-square analysis (p ≤ 0.05). Next,
we used thematic coding and a grounded theory approach to
identify emergent themes in landowner responses to open-
ended questions. These were subsequently numerically
translated into dichotomous variables (0 or 1), corresponding
to the absence or presence, respectively, of a theme in an
interview transcript. Such quantification enabled us to
examine associations between the themes, landowner study
site, and responses to closed-ended items.  
Finally, we used Dufrêne-Legendre indicator value (IV)
analysis (Dufrêne and Legendre 1997, Bakker 2008) to test
for associations between emergent themes and study site or
landowner responses to closed-ended items. In the latter case,
we ran a blocked indicator value analysis and accounted for
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Table 4. Relationships between stakeholder group and participant responses to closed-ended questionnaire items regarding the
principles and structure of WfW’s proposed ecosystem service approach to clearing IAPs on private land, Western Cape. Values
are the frequency observed (expected) based on chi-square tests.
 Stakeholder Group
Variable Landowners Conservation Professionals WfW Managers X2 p
Shared responsibility (n = 156) 19.9 .001
shared 107 (104) 18 (23) 18 (17)
unshared 5 (6) 3 (1) 0 (1)
unsure 1 (4) 4 (1) 0 (1)
Responsibility category (n = 131) 1.04 0.79
solely or primarily landowner 63 (61) -- 8 (10)
equal landowner and government 30 (31) -- 6 (5)
solely or primarily government 19 (20) -- 4 (3)
Regulatory enforcement (n = 155) 9.50 0.05
agree 73 (80) 20 (18) 17 (13)
disagree 34 (28) 3 (6) 1 (4)
unsure 5 (5) 2 (1) 0 (1)
Motivational incentives (n = 154) 1.24 0.87
agree 105 (106) 24 (24) 18 (17)
disagree 5 (4) 1 (1) 0 (1)
unsure 1(1) 0 (0) 0 (1)
Monetary incentives (n = 154) 23.5 <0.001
agree 102 (96) 22 (22) 9 (16)
disagree 8 (14) 3 (3) 8 (2)
unsure 1 (1) 0 (0) 1 (0)
Quantity of proposed financial incentive (n = 150) 31.1 <0.001
fully sufficient 41 (31) 0 (7) 1 (4)
somewhat sufficient 41(48) 17 (11) 6 (6)
not at all sufficient 26(24) 2 (5) 4 (3)
unsure 4 (9) 6 (2) 2 (1)
Duration of proposed financial incentive (n = 150) 35.4 <0.001
fully sufficient 40 (31) 1 (7) 0 (4)
somewhat sufficient 36 (48) 20 (11) 8 (6)
not at all sufficient 29 (23) 0 (5) 2 (3)
unsure 7 (11) 4 (2) 3 (1)
landowner study site as a blocking factor. Statistical
significance of IVs was determined via Monte Carlo
randomizations (5000 permutations). 
We conducted chi-squared tests with IBM SPSS Statistics
version 18, and indicator value analysis in PC-ORD 6.0.
Transcriptions of landowner interviews were analyzed with
the aid of ATLAS.ti version 6.1.1.
RESULTS
Government and landowner responsibility
By far the largest majority (92%) of all stakeholders believed
responsibility for clearing IAPs on private land should be
shared among government and landowners ( p = 0.001; Table
4). Although landowners were generally positive toward the
notion of shared responsibility for IAP clearing efforts,
variation existed in terms of the level of responsibility they
were willing to assume. More than half (53%) believed
responsibility for clearing IAPs should be solely or primarily
the landowners’, 27% believed it should be shared equally
between them and the government, and 15% considered it
solely or primarily the government’s responsibility (Table 5).
There were no significant differences in perceptions among
stakeholder groups regarding the level of landowner and
government responsibility (p = 0.79).  
Qualitative analysis of landowner interview transcripts
produced emergent themes associated with government and
landowner responsibility for clearing IAPs (Table 6). Indicator
analysis showed strong associations between four emergent
themes and landowners’ responses to the closed-ended
question about responsibility (Table 7). Two themes,
“landowners have a duty to steward property” and
“landowners can clear at a lower overall cost”, were associated
with landowners who perceive they should hold sole or
primary responsibility for clearing IAPs (P < 0.01, 52 and
22%, respectively; n = 63). The theme “government
coordination is needed” was marginally associated with
landowners who perceive equal responsibility between
themselves and the government (P = 0.056, 43%, n = 30). The
theme “the state’s historic role in IAP introduction and spread”
was associated with landowners who perceive the government
should take sole or primary responsibility for clearing IAPs
(P < 0.01, 58%, n = 19).  
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Table 5. Relationships between landowner study site and participant responses to closed-ended questionnaire items regarding
the principles and structure of WfW’s proposed ecosystem service approach to clearing IAPs on private land, Western Cape.
Values are the frequency observed (expected) based on chi-square tests.
 Landowner Study Site
Variable Wilderness Grabouw Citrusdal X2 p
Shared responsibility (n = 113) 4.67 0.32
shared 38 (39) 35 (35) 34 (33)
unshared 3 (2) 2 (2) 0 (2)
unsure 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0)
Responsibility category (n = 112) 8.89 0.064
solely or primarily landowner 28 (23) 22 (21) 13 (19)
equal landowner and government 8 (11) 11 (10) 11 (9)
solely or primarily government 5 (7) 4 (6) 10 (6)
Regulatory enforcement (n = 112) 6.99 0.14
agree 32 (26) 23 (24) 18 (23)
disagree 7 (12) 12 (11) 15 (11)
unsure 1 (2) 2 (2) 2 (2)
Motivational incentives (n = 111) 0.831 0.081
agree 39 (38) 36 (34) 30 (33)
disagree 1 (2) 0 (2) 4 (2)
unsure 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0)
Monetary incentives (n = 111) 2.68 0.61
agree 38 (37) 33 (33) 31 (32)
disagree 2 (3) 3 (3) 3 (3)
unsure 0 (0) 0 (0) 1 (0)
Quantity of proposed financial incentive (n = 112) 15.0 0.02
fully sufficient 13 (15) 18 (14) 10 (13)
somewhat sufficient 13 (15) 17 (14) 11 (13)
not at all sufficient 11 (9) 2 (9) 13 (8)
unsure 3 (1) 1 (1) 0 (1)
Duration of proposed financial incentive (n =112) 12.2 0.057
fully sufficient 15 (14) 16 (13) 9 (13)
somewhat sufficient 11 (13) 15 (12) 10 (11)
not at all sufficient 11 (10) 3 (10) 15 (9)
unsure 3 (3) 3 (2) 1 (2)
Across study sites, marginally significant differences (P =
0.064) in landowner perceptions of responsibility for clearing
IAPs on private land were observed (Table 5). A greater
percentage of Citrusdal landowners believed management of
IAPs on private property should be primarily the government’s
responsibility (29%, n = 34), compared to those located in
Wilderness (11%, n = 38) and Grabouw (9%, n = 35).  
Indicator value analysis demonstrated strong associations
between two emergent themes and landowner study site
(Tables 6 and 7). The theme “neighboring public lands have
not been cleared” was associated with the Wilderness study
site (P < 0.01, 46%, n = 41), the area with the greatest
proportion of public lands. While the theme “riverside
properties bear unfair costs” was associated with Citrusdal (P
< 0.001, 34%, n = 35), the area where IAPs are largely
concentrated along waterways.
Policy tools
Among all the stakeholders (96%, n = 154), support for the
use of extension services to motivate landowners to clear IAPs
on their properties was overwhelming (Table 4). The majority
of stakeholders (86%, n = 154) supported the provision of
financial assistance for landowners. However, there was
differential support for the use of monetary incentives across
stakeholder groups, with a larger percentage of WfW
managers disagreeing with the use of such incentives (44%, n
= 18), when compared to the landowners (7%, n = 111) and
conservation professionals (12%, n = 25). Managers who
disagreed with the use of financial incentives expressed a
concern that emphasis on financial incentives alone would be
insufficient. According to one manager, “No matter how much
money is spent on the ground, it is all fruitless unless there is
significant buy-in from the landowner.” 
The majority of all stakeholders (71%, n = 155) believed
clearing IAPs on private land should be required by law (Table
4). However, there were significant differences among
stakeholder groups, and a greater percentage of landowners
did not support (30%, n = 112) the use of a legal mandate,
when compared to either conservation professionals (12%, n
= 25) or WfW managers (6%, n = 18, P = 0.05). These
landowners were mainly concerned that a legal mandate would
overstep their financial self-interest or property rights. 
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Table 6. Emergent themes based on landowner responses to open-ended interview questions regarding (a) landowner and
government responsibility for clearing invasive alien plants (IAPs); and (b) the quantity and duration of financial assistance
proposed in WfW’s approach to clearing IAPs on private land, Western Cape. Only themes showing a significant association
with landowner study site or landowner responses to closed-ended questionnaire items are presented (see Table 7).
 Emergent Theme Frequency
(n = 113)
%
(a) Private cost for public benefit 41 36
Landowners bear substantial economic costs to remove IAPs, but do not necessarily receive a direct monetary benefit.
Landowners have a duty to steward property 40 35
The property belongs to the landowner and he/she has a duty to care for the land.
Neighboring public lands have not been cleared 33 29
Where public lands contain IAP infestation, these areas can provide a source of alien seed moving onto bordering
private property. The government cannot take responsibility for clearing IAPs on private property, or enforce legal
mandates to remove IAPs on private property when adjacent public lands have not been cleared.
The state’s historic role in IAP introduction and spread 33 29
Historically, the government played a central role in the introduction and spread of IAPs. Landowners have inherited
the IAP problem as a result of past government-supported initiatives.
Government coordination is needed 33 29
The spatial and temporal scale of IAP infestations transcends the scope of individual landowners and their property
boundaries. Thus, government-led coordination, planning, and commitment will be required to clear IAPs.
Landowners can clear at a lower overall cost 14 12
Landowners hold knowledge of local resource dynamics that is superior to that of government. Thus, landowner
command of IAP management is the most cost-effective and pragmatic option.
Riverside properties bear unfair costs 14 12
Rivers are conduits for IAPs and water is a public good. Private landowners with property alongside rivers bear an
unfair share of the cost burden for clearing, without receiving proportional resource benefits.
(b) Ecological unpredictability 43 38
Financial incentives should make provision for stochastic or unpredictable ecological change (e.g., unplanned fires,
new or emerging IAP species, and variation in IAP response to treatment).
Prefer to work more slowly 25 22
Express a preference for clearing IAPs at a slower pace. Concerned about
potential non-target effects of rapid, large-scale clearing on native species, on wildlife habitats or landowner’s ability
to utilize the leftover IAP biomass.
No differences were found across the landowner study sites
with respect to level of support for motivational, monetary or
legal incentives (Table 5).
Financial assistance
Slightly more than a quarter of all the stakeholders combined
believed the quantity (28%) and duration (27%) of WfW’s
proposed financial assistance would be fully sufficient to
overcome landowners’ financial barriers to clearing IAPs. The
majority believed the proposed quantity (43%, n = 150) and
duration (43%, n = 150) would be somewhat sufficient, and
21% believed the proposed financial assistance would wholly
insufficient (Table 4). 
Significant differences across stakeholder groups were
observed, with a greater percentage of landowners who
believed the quantity (37%, n =112) and duration (37%, n =
112) of the proposed assistance would be fully sufficient, than
was the case among the conservation professionals (0% and
4%, respectively, n = 25) and WfW managers (8% and 0%,
respectively, n = 13; p < 0.001 and p < 0.0001).  
Landowners from the three study sites also differed in their
perceptions of WfW’s proposed financial assistance (Table
5). A greater percentage of Grabouw landowners (49%, n=37)
believed the quantity would be fully sufficient, compared to
landowners in Wilderness (33%, n = 40) and Citrusdal (29%,
n = 35). Conversely, a greater percentage (P =0.057; Table 4)
of landowners in both Grabouw (43%, n = 37) and Wilderness
(38%, n = 40) believed the duration of the proposed financial
assistance would be fully sufficient, compared to landowners
in Citrusdal (26%, n = 35).  
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Table 7. Results from Dufrêne-Legendre Indicator Value Analysis of associations between landowner study site, landowner
responses to closed-ended questionnaire items, and emergent themes regarding (a) landowner and government responsibility









- Wilderness Neighboring public lands have not been cleared 26 15.0 3.1 <0.01
- Citrusdal Riverside properties bear unfair costs 30 8.1 2.6 <0.001
Closed-ended response
- Primarily/solely landowner Landowners have a duty to steward property 34 18.0 3.9 <0.01
Landowners can clear at a lower overall cost 22 8.6 3.2 <0.01
- Equal responsibility Government coordination is needed 23 15.0 4.0 0.06
- Primarily/solely government The state’s historic role in IAP introduction and spread 33 15.0 3.8 <0.01
(b) Study Site
- Wilderness Prefer to work more slowly 18 12.0 3.0 0.05
- Citrusdal Ecological unpredictability 31 19.0 3.2 <0.01
†Indicator values are presented as percentage of perfect association.
‡Significance (p < 0.05) was determined with Monte Carlo randomization. Only significant associations are presented.
Qualitative analysis of landowner interview transcriptions
revealed six emergent themes associated with the financial
structure of WfW’s proposed approach (Table 6). Indicator
value analysis detected associations between two emergent
themes and the landowner study sites (Table 7). The theme
“prefer to work more slowly” was associated with primarily
residential landowners in Wilderness (P = 0.05; 34%, n = 41),
while the theme “ecological unpredictability” was associated
with landowners in Citrusdal (P < 0.01; 63%, n = 35), where
landowners are primarily farmers with large property sizes
and the greatest percentage of landowners have previous
experience working with WFW to clear IAPs from their
properties. 
We did not find associations between emergent themes and
landowners’ categorical responses regarding the quantity and
duration of financial assistance proposed in WfW’s approach
(Table 7).
DISCUSSION
Outcomes of ES schemes are strongly dependent on the degree
to which institutional arrangements interact with the local
ecological and socioeconomic context to influence the
conservation behavior of landowners and other key
stakeholders. Our results suggest that probing stakeholders
directly is a valuable means of gaining insight into these
contextual factors. We found strong associations between a
few key factors and stakeholder perceptions toward the policy
principles and financial structure of WfW’s approach. Key
factors included characteristics of the landowners, the
landscapes in which they live, and the ESs they manage.  
Several of the factors we identify as important may have broad
relevance for the design of ES programs elsewhere. As such,
these data contribute to the growing body of literature on the
institutional design of an ES approach to conservation in
working landscapes. We therefore outline the implications of
our findings for the design of WfW’s approach and frame this
discussion within the broader scope of ESs.
Government and landowner responsibility
An overwhelming majority of stakeholders agreed that
responsibility for IAP management on private land should be
shared among landowners and the government. This finding
bodes well for the development of collaborative partnerships
to clear IAPs on private land in the Western Cape. Widespread
recognition that responsibility for IAPs, and for associated
ESs, lies in the hands of both public and private sectors reflects
a general shift away from government command and control
toward broader and more inclusive environmental
governance, as documented elsewhere (Cocklin et al. 2007,
Winter et al. 2007, Pasquini et al. 2010).  
Nevertheless, there was variation in the level of responsibility
landowners were willing to assume. Enhanced understanding
of the values informing landowner perceptions of their
responsibility in the stewardship of ESs can guide the design
of institutions to better facilitate communication and
understanding among stakeholders and, ultimately, better
conserve ESs. 
Landowners who believed they should take primary
responsibility for clearing IAPs also tended to believe that they
could do so at a lower overall cost. This belief seems to be
based primarily on a perception that landowners hold
knowledge of local resource dynamics that is superior to that
of government. Landowners viewed themselves as best
qualified for conducting the IAP clearing work and thus,
landowner command of IAP management was justified as the
most cost-effective and pragmatic alternative (Coase 1960,
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Siebert et al. 2006, German and Keeler 2010). These
landowners also tended to believe that they have an ethical
duty to steward their property, and thus to clear IAPs. This
finding is consistent with previous studies that suggest
landowners with a strong conservation ethic are more likely
to be positively motivated to take responsibility for the
conservation of ESs (Kabii and Horwitz 2006, Siebert et al.
2006). 
In contrast, landowners who supported equal landowner and
government responsibility tended to perceive a need for
government coordination of IAP management across property
boundaries. This finding echoes Goldman et al.’s (2007)
conclusion that effective IAP management should occur
across multiple landholdings and at a landscape scale. It also
suggests that alien species are perceived as “weakest-link”
public goods, i.e., the successful control of IAPs will be limited
by the least effective provider (Perrings et al. 2002). In this
case, the weakest link would be nonparticipant landowners. 
Finally, landowners who expected the government to accept
greater responsibility tended to refer to the state’s historic role
in the introduction and spread of IAPs (Carruthers et al. 2011).
Since the state played a strong role in introducing IAPs, these
landowners tend to believe the current government should
accept a greater portion of the responsibility for removing the
species once they become a problem. Landowners’ responses
suggest adherence to a “polluter pays” discourse of
environmental governance, according to which the actor
responsible for producing pollution (in this case the
introduction of IAPs) should be held responsible for paying
the damage rendered to the natural environment (Pigou 1932,
Salzman 2005).  
People’s perceptions and landscape structures are in a
reciprocal relationship (Nassauer 1995). We observed links
between biophysical and land use attributes of the study sites
and the perspectives of the landowners toward their own
responsibility and that of the government. These findings
emphasize the importance of both ecological and
socioeconomic contexts in the design of institutions for ESs
(Jack et al. 2008). 
The perceptions of Wilderness landowners appeared to be
influenced by a land use attribute, in that this site comprises
a greater proportion of public land than the other two sites. Of
the three sites, Wilderness contained the highest proportion of
respondents who believed landowners should be primarily
responsible for clearing IAPs. At the same time, Wilderness
landowners tended to refer to the fact that neighboring public
lands have not been cleared, and expressed concern that public
lands would act as source populations for IAP (re)invasions
onto their properties. Many of these landowners did not think
the government should be responsible for IAP management
on private land until adjoining public lands had been
successfully cleared. Broader landscape-scale coordination
across public and private landholdings was identified as an
important criterion for effective acceptance of the approach
among these landowners.  
In contrast to Wilderness, Citrusdal contained the highest
proportion of landowners who believed the government
should be primarily responsible for clearing IAPs. This finding
may be understood as a function of Citrusdal’s arid climate,
which results in the concentration of IAPs along rivers. This
biophysical attribute appeared to influence landowner
perceptions toward the division of responsibility for clearing
IAPs. Riversides are critical areas for IAP management, both
as conduits for IAP dispersal and as sources of the water
benefits resulting from IAP clearing operations (Le Maitre et
al. 1996, Le Maitre et al. 2000, Esler et al. 2008). As is the
case with most ESs, water is a public resource, and landowners
may not directly benefit from the increased water resources
released by their own clearing efforts. It is therefore not
surprising that Citrusdal landowners expressed concerns about
riverside properties bearing unfair costs associated with IAP
clearing, as these landowners bear a disproportionate cost,
while resource benefits are shared more equally. Previous
studies have noted concerns among landowners that they may
be forced to bear disproportionate costs or incur losses from
conservation initiatives that primarily benefit the public, thus
creating or accentuating social and economic inequalities for
certain landowners (Klapproth and Johnson 2001). The issue
of who should pay, and how the needs and circumstances of
different landowners can be addressed equitably, is a recurring
theme among conservation initiatives on private land (Kabii
and Horwitz 2006).
Policy tools
ES programs can call upon an array of mechanisms to
encourage stakeholder engagement. Mechanisms include, for
example, financial incentives, regulations (legal mandates),
and motivational tools (extension services, education, and
information) (Young et al. 1996, Botha 2001). Although there
is generally a focus on financial incentives within the
framework of ESs, whether these are more effective singly or
as part of a policy mix, and how various instruments should
be combined, are fundamental questions that remain to be
answered (Engel et al. 2008). 
The majority of stakeholders expressed support for the use of
financial incentives, motivational tools, and regulations in
WfW’s Approach to Work on Private Land. This finding
suggests that a mix of incentives and disincentives may be an
effective approach to engage landowners in IAP clearing on
their property. Policy analysis (Pagiola and Platais 2007) and
economic theory (Landell-Mills and Porras 2002) in relation
to ESs also suggest that the integration of financial payments
with a broader array of policy approaches can improve the
likelihood of achieving desired outcomes.
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Financial incentives
For ES payments to be an effective policy tool, incentives must
be sufficient to offset private costs for engaging in
conservation management. It is therefore important to note
that the majority of stakeholders deemed the proposed
financial structure to be only somewhat sufficient.
Landowners were also more divided on this issue than was the
case among the other stakeholder groups.  
Landowners in Wilderness and Citrusdal were more likely
than those in Grabouw to consider the proposed subsidy
duration as wholly insufficient, but for different reasons. The
largely residential landowners in Wilderness tended to prefer
to work more slowly than was proposed, and expressed
concerns that the rapid removal of IAPs could result in
unintended negative consequences for native species, wildlife
habitat, and/or their ability to utilize leftover IAP biomass.
Use and adoption of IAPs in local livelihoods as natural
resources (i.e., woodfuels, lumber, food) and as sources of
wildlife habitat suggest a need to take into account the effects
of IAP clearing on a broader suite of values and interests
pertaining to ESs (Shackleton et al. 2007, Kull et al. 2011).  
In contrast, Citrusdal landowners expressed concerns about a
possible mismatch between the fixed structure of the proposed
subsidy and the complex, dynamic nature of the ecological
systems they aim to manage. This “problem of fit” between
institutional arrangements and ecological dynamics is a well-
documented challenge in environmental governance (Folke et
al. 2007). Landowners believed the financial subsidy should
be adapted to accommodate ecological unpredictability in the
form of unplanned fire events, new or emerging IAP species,
or unanticipated variation in IAP response to control
treatments. Within a fixed time frame, landowners feared that
after the incentive period they could find their property “back
to square one”, without any additional IAP clearing assistance.
 
Landowners’ previous experience in collaborating with WfW
to clear IAP may also have been an important factor
influencing perceptions of the proposed financial assistance.
More than two-thirds of landowners in Citrusdal had worked
with WfW before, while only 22% of landowners in Grabouw
had such previous experience. At the same time, a much higher
percentage of these Grabouw landowners (49%) than their
Citrusdal counterparts (26%) considered the proposed
financial assistance as fully sufficient. This finding suggests
a potential obstacle to long-term IAP control if landowners’
expectations are not met by management realities. WfW runs
the risk of expending limited resources to clear IAPs in areas
where landowners have not secured adequate resources to
sustain the follow-up work after WfW’s assistance period, and
thus these areas may be more likely to return to pre-
management conditions. Previous studies have shown that
former participation in a similar scheme is a strong indicator
of landowner willingness to participate in a conservation
action (Morris and Potter 1995, Siebert et al. 2006). In contrast
to previous studies, we found experienced landowners were
more likely to possess a realistic portrait of the time and
financial commitment required to do the work, and thus were
more likely to decline engagement with the program, given
the proposed financial incentive.
CONCLUSION
Enhanced understanding of the values informing landowner
perceptions of their responsibility in the stewardship of ESs
can guide the design of institutions to better facilitate
communication and understanding among stakeholders and,
ultimately, better conserve ESs. Our findings from the Western
Cape suggest the following concepts should be considered in
the design of institutions to clear IAPs and for the conservation
of ESs on private lands:  
● shared responsibility between landowners and
government; 
● a policy mix combining financial incentives with
regulations and motivational tools; 
● acknowledgement of the state’s historical role in the
introduction and spread of IAPs; 
● integrated coordination of IAP management across
public and private lands; 
● incentives that target potentially greater costs, and ES
benefits, resulting from IAP management in riparian
compared to upland environments; 
● consideration of a broader suite of ESs important to
landowners (i.e., wildlife habitat, wood resources); 
● design of more flexible financial assistance to respond to
resource dynamics resulting from stochastic fire events,
new and emerging IAP species, and/or unanticipated
variation in treatment response; and 
● effective communication to provide landowners with
clear expectations regarding the level of IAP
maintenance required over the long term. 
An example of how these institutional design concepts could
be applied in practice, would be to link WfW’s financial
assistance to IAP reductions levels, thus shifting away from a
fixed time frame for financial assistance toward an incentive
target defined by on the ground outcomes in reductions of IAP.
This shift would allow for flexibility to match variation in
environmental characteristics of individual properties, and
thus address the “problem of fit” between fixed financial
assistance and unpredictable ecological dynamics. A program
that is orientated toward an IAP reduction target would reduce
landowner concern that they could find their property “back
to square one” without any additional IAP clearing assistance,
and would thus support greater willingness of landowners to
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participate in IAP management on their property. We conclude
that stakeholder analysis is a fundamental, although
underrepresented, means of gaining insight into the
opportunities and constraints that face ES conservation in
working landscapes, and an important complement to
biophysical and economic valuation methods of inquiry.
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